


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Figure 1 displays a sequence of handwritten digits, specifically the digit '4', arranged in a grid. The grid consists of 5 rows and 15 columns. The first 14 columns show the digit '4' formed by a sequence of strokes, with the final stroke being a vertical line. The 15th column shows the digit '4' formed by a sequence of strokes, with the final stroke being a vertical line. The images are arranged in a grid, with the first row containing 15 images and the subsequent rows containing 14 images each. The images show the digit '4' being formed by a sequence of strokes, with the final stroke being a vertical line. The images are arranged in a grid, with the first row containing 15 images and the subsequent rows containing 14 images each. The images show the digit '4' being formed by a sequence of strokes, with the final stroke being a vertical line.



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Deriving Descriptions of the Mind

Technical Report PCG-7

Steve Garlick and Kurt VanLehn

Departments of Psychology and Computer Science
Carnegie-Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213 U.S.A.

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
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Abstract

Cirrus is a tool for protocol analysis. Given an encoded protocol of a subject solving problems, it constructs a model that will produce the same protocol as the subject when it is applied to the same problems. In order to parameterize Cirrus for a task domain, the user must supply it with a problem space: a vocabulary of attributes and values for describing spaces, a set of primitive operators, and a set of macro-operators. Cirrus' model of the subject is a hierarchical plan that is designed to be executed by an agenda-based plan follower. In this paper, the philosophical and mathematical foundations of Cirrus are explored.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2
1.1. Function and Structure: Two Alternatives in Describing Cognition	2
2. Fundamentals of Descriptive Cognition	7
2.1. A Functional Theory: Fundamental Hypotheses	9
3. Induction and Psychological Modelling: a brief review	12
3.1. Attribute Selection	15
3.2. Summary	19
4. Computational Details of Cirrus	19
4.1. Data Encoding	20
4.2. Parsing	21
4.3. Attribute Encoding	22
4.4. Decision Tree Construction	23
4.5. Attribute Selection	24
5. An Analysis of Subtraction Protocols	26
5.1. Procedure	26
5.2. Results	28
6. Discussion	31
6.1. Limitations of Protocol Analysis of Solution Paths	31
6.2. A Basis for Data Reduction	32
6.3. Automated Student Modelling	34
6.4. Evaluation of Decomposition and Ordering Principles	36
6.5. Limitations and Problems	37
6.6. Conclusions	38



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1. Introduction

1.1. Function and Structure: Two Alternatives in Describing Cognition

In this section we outline a distinction between *Functional* and *Structural* viewpoints in psychological theory. We postulate that the source of the distinction is in the source of constraints that inform theory building. Subsequently, we propose that functional level theories should hypothesize only functional relationships and we present a computational model describing this process.

Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1987) trace the history of two alternative approaches in the development of the new sciences of cognition. One approach, which we label the *functional* approach, saw that there was a common level of description between the symbol-manipulating capacities of the digital computer, and the apparent symbol-manipulating capacities of the human information processor. This common level was described by the *Physical Symbol System* hypothesis (Newell, 1980, 1982), and in short, stated that the necessary and sufficient ingredient for intelligence was a system capable of manipulating symbols, regardless of whether this system was implemented in silicon or organic substrates. The analogy drawn by Newell is on a formal level, that is, the bridge between brains and computers lies in their representational ability.

The second approach, which we label the *structural* approach, drew its inspiration not from the capacities of the digital computer, but from the emerging neurological sciences. Rosenblatt (1962) considered that cognition should begin in the processes and organization of the physical system underlying intelligence.

It is both easier and more profitable to axiomatize the *physical system* and then investigate this system analytically to determine its behaviour, than to axiomatize the *behaviour* and then design a physical system by techniques of logical synthesis.

(Rosenblatt, 1962; in Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1987). This approach is currently represented by the burgeoning school called connectionism, which utilizes massively parallel connections of simple computational neuron-like units to model cognitive phenomena (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986).

These two approaches have different points of view as to what constitutes an adequate basis for describing cognition. Currently there is much debate over the veracity, purpose and usefulness of one over the other of these viewpoints. The difference has been described as a symbolic-subsymbolic distinction (Smolensky, 1984, 1986) although both classes of models are clearly symbolic in that both seek to represent (symbolize) certain aspects of cognition. Others have argued that the difference is one of levels of description, an *implementational* level as contrasted to an *algorithmic* level of description (Anderson, 1987; Marr, 1982). We prefer to avoid this terminology since it implies a definite causal ordering; i.e., that the implementational level merely exists to implement pre-existing algorithms. To avoid this implication, we have termed the two viewpoints *functional* and *structural*.

We wish to argue that the difference between the two classes of theory stems from the different sources of constraint that informs the two classes of theory. The *functional* approach argues that representation is the basis of cognition. Cognition should be described in terms of the formal structures capable of manipulating the relationship between such symbolic objects to achieve the logical requirements for computation. Smolensky (1986) describes this as follows: we have theories with descriptive entities such as formal logic, that capture human information processing in some high level domains (such as mathematics and circuit analysis). Symbolic theorists attempt to extend this high level of description "down the abyss", to attempt to describe the vast middle ground of cognition for which there is no formal domain theory, in terms of rules and effective procedures. Thus, the source of constraints for these types of theories is the actual task domain. This

appeals to a more *functional* level of analysis, where the constraints for a computational theory are drawn from the functional requirements of the task. (c.f., Chomsky's notion of competence).

The connectionists on the other hand, stated that cognition was an *emergent* property of the arrangement of the physical units of the brain. Their paradigm is that intermediate cognition is of the same kind as low level perceptual processing and is well described by reference to low-level constraints on the type of computation that can be performed by the brain. These constraints are dictated by structural considerations, such as the parallel nature of neuronal structure and computational abilities of richly interconnected units with only local information. Thus, connectionists attempt to climb "up the abyss" to the mid-ground of cognition from a structural level of description whose constraints derive from neural considerations.

Our current concern is not to contrast these two theoretical approaches, but to draw an implication from the distinction. The functional approach describes the competencies required by certain tasks, while implementational level theories give structural accounts of how such functional competencies may be achieved in a neurally plausible way. We argue that this distinction should be taken seriously in cognitive science, and should dictate the kind of theoretical entities that are appropriate at each level. We further wish to argue that the model of cognition presented here, which certainly falls within the functional approach, demonstrated how this distinction might be taken seriously. It does so by presenting a method of inducing the functional competency of a particular domain skill without invoking hypothesized structure.

The argument is as follows. Some domains of human competence are rule-like; they embody a theory or an effective procedure. Usually this rule structure is something derived

from the environment and serves to describe the structure of the task. For example, there are rules for performing subtraction procedures. These rules are codified in the teaching environment and the successful learner is one who succeeds in internalizing these rules.

Functional theories are capable of describing this level of rule-using competence. They are descriptive, detailing at the level of logic and computation, the abilities required for executing a particular task. Descriptive devices to describe such abilities are rules and representations. For example, consider the production rule formulation from Anderson's well-known ACT* theory (1983).

```
IF      the goal is to subtract the digits in a column
        and the subtrahend is larger than the minuend
THEN set a subgoal to borrow.
```

This rule formalizes a particular piece of competency required to accomplish that task. Note that as such, it is descriptive of the *task domain* rather than of the performer of the task.

A collection of such rules can describe the competency required to perform a particular skill in a certain domain. To verify completeness and sufficiency, such rules can actually be "run" in a computational formalism called a production system, which effectively provides the control structures to determine the order of firing of these rules, and provides the storage facilities to keep track of inputs and partial answers. We argue that the production system itself is useful in determining the sufficiency of the postulated set of rules.

One problem with this approach to determining functional knowledge is that the rule set must be deduced apriori. For domains which have a clear formal domain theory this is not a huge problem (c.f., the rule sets for geometry proofs in Anderson et al. 1981). In effect determining the knowledge that a problem-solver has in a domain then becomes a generate and test cycle. We generate a set of rules and then test them in a production system to determine the sufficiency of the postulated rule set. Note that no claims for necessity can

be made for such a derivation method.

An alternative to this approach would be to attempt to determine this functional knowledge from the actual performance of a problem solver. Rather than extract the proposed competence from the task domain, it may be instructive to derive this knowledge from the student. We may be able to look through the student's eyes at the acquired domain knowledge, rather than just postulating necessary knowledge.

A secondary concern with the functional approach is that the mechanism for determining the completeness of the rule set (e.g., the production system interpreter) may start to look attractive as the structural basis with which such competence is achieved. By eliminating the generate and test cycle, and deriving the rule set that characterizes a task domain from actual performance data, we eliminate the need for an executing mechanism to guarantee sufficiency, and thus avoid the need for statements about structural hardware employed by the problem solver. This avoids the problem of making structural propositions based on a functional source of constraints. We return to this problem in our conclusions.

The model of cognition presented here directly confronts the need to extract the functional knowledge of a problem solver, without being seduced into making structural assumptions. (We will later argue that structural hypotheses should be made within structurally constrained theories). This paper presents a theory of how the description of the mind should proceed. We describe how a theory of cognition at the symbolic level should be descriptive of what is the mental competence of the subject under exploration. In the next section, we detail what we see as the principle assumptions required by models of cognition that recognize their inherently descriptive nature.

2. Fundamentals of Descriptive Cognition

At the "symbolic timescale" (when we consider cognitive actions in .5 to 10 second chunks), some forms of cognitive behavior¹ can be meaningfully described as a series of operators that move the cognizer through a sequence of states, leading to a more desired state, namely the goal of the sequence of actions. This formulation was proposed initially by Newell and Simon (1972) and was termed the *Problem Space hypothesis*. They characterized problem solving and other phenomena as search within the problem space, which consisted of all the possible knowledge states in a particular domain, and which was traversed by the application of operators to transform one state into the next. The path so traced through the hypothesized problem space was termed a *solution path*. The problem space hypothesis suggests that we may understand problem solving behavior in terms of operator application sequences leading to the goal state.

How can we understand what gave rise to such a sequence of behaviours? We posit that the task for a functional theory of cognition is to describe the states that lead to such a sequence of behavior. Historically, this was also the task that the behaviorist tradition set for itself. They proposed that to understand the responses made by an organism, one only need know the stimulus conditions holding at the time of a response, since what the cognizer *really* knew was an association between this stimulus configuration and the response. This notion is embodied in Clark Hull's formulation of the famous rule $\text{Behavior} = F(\text{Stimulus Intensity, Drive, Habit Strength, Incentive Reinforcement})$, stating this association

In line with this behaviorist credo, we accept that there will be features of the stimulus situation that will be causally related to the particular response of the organism. Further understanding such an association is a fruitful way to describe and understand the

¹That is, behavior sequences for which there exists a formal domain theory.

competence of the subject. This leads to our first principle of functional cognitive theory.

*Cognitive behavior can be described as a sequence of State (S_i) - Operator (O_j) pairs such that there exists a function F that maps from S_i to O_j . We term this the *Regularity* principle.*

However, since we are proposing a theory of cognition rather than behavior, we need to consider more than just the *external state* at the time of the behavior. We must also consider features of the *internal state*, attributes describing the state of the information processor. Internal state attributes may describe features relating to goals of the organism, partial results, past history and the state of the processor itself. Thus, the *Regularity* principle needs to be extended to include internal state such that any response of the organism is best described by the salient features of *internal state* and/or *external state*. This leads to our next assumption about function theory.

Our second principle concerns the nature of the response of the organism. Just as a cognitive theory needs the capacity to represent internal state, it also needs the capacity to represent internal operators that may change internal state. This is just another way of saying that observed behavior is not necessarily the result of a unitary internal act, but that multiple internal states and operators, in a sequence of state-operator changes, may have preceded the externally observed behavior. Much has been written about the decomposability of complex skills, generally under the rubric of hierarchical goal structured behavior. The most convenient way of describing such decomposability is by way of a grammar. We title our second principle the *Decomposition* principle.

To summarize the two principles that we have suggested form the basis of a descriptive functional-level theory of cognition, we have suggested firstly, that cognitive behavior at the symbolic level, may best be understood by knowing features of the internal and external world that were significant at the time of the behavior (the *Regularity* principle). Secondly,

we acknowledge the need to describe internal operations. Note that we do not feel constrained to say how these operations may be implemented. Rather they exist because of task demands and external theories that the learner has internalized. They correlate with theories of task decomposition. These internal task decompositions may best be described as a grammar, and so we label our second principle the decomposition principle. These two principles in themselves do not constitute a functional theory of cognition. In fact, we label them principles since they are not falsifiable. However, they do establish the framework for a descriptive functional theory of cognition, which we consider in the next section.

2.1. A Functional Theory: Fundamental Hypotheses

We have just considered how a functional theory of cognition should determine the relevant parameters of behavior which are $Operator = F (State_{internal}, State_{external})$. In this section we consider some of the assumptions necessary to mechanistically determine this relationship. We do this by detailing the assumptional basis for a computational implementation of this theory called *Cirrus*.

External state is given as data, but how are we to determine internal state? Internal state is determined by a theory of domain structure. That is, the specification of internal state is a theory given by the experimenter as to how a certain competency may be achieved. In the procedural skills that we will discuss, the internal state theory describes how the top-level task is decomposed into smaller task steps. It is reasonable to assume that complex tasks, particularly those taught in formal education, have an associated method for "divide and conquer" specifications how difficult problems can be reduced to simpler problems for which the student has already acquired competence. This task decomposition can be described as a *grammar hypothesis*, which describes the hierarchical structure of the task. The grammar specifies how a given skill is decomposed hierarchically to give internal goal

states.

We can decompose the knowledge implied by the grammar into two components. One component, the *goal component* is the actual task decomposition, its goal structure. This component is given by the rewrite rules of the grammar. However, grammars may be non-deterministic. That is, one left hand side (LHS) clause may expand into multiple right hand side (RHS) rules. This component may be labelled the *method knowledge*, which of a set of possible operations to apply. We can extend the grammar to be an *annotated grammar* to include this information. In the present model, we assume this information to be included in the operators, which contain general base restrictions for when they are appropriate. Adopting this approach simplifies the models constructed. For example, a grammar rule might specify that the operator *Sub1Col* could be replaced by either *ShowTop* or *Difference*. Which operator was produced by expanding this rule is dictated by conditions for applicability for the operator (i.e., that the bottom digit equals 0 for *ShowTop*).

In addition to a specification of the task decomposition rules, we need to specify an *ordering hypothesis*. This hypothesis covers the way we theorize that the skill performance is ordered, that is, what determines the order of subgoal expansion. As a model of how such a goal tree may be ordered, we could appeal to a stack model of subgoal processing (c.f., Soar, (Laird, Rosenbloom and Newell, 1984, 1985, 1986; Rosenbloom, Laird, McDermott, Newell and Orlich, 1985) with its universal subgoaling). That is, the order of expanding subgoal nodes is given by a deterministic order.

However, we feel that the stack model is a special case of the more general *agenda* model, in which the order of subgoal expansion is non-deterministic. Roughly, the agenda ordering hypothesis states that the subgoal operators expanded from a goal are executed in an order that is not specified by the goal tree. Note that the assumption of an agenda

mechanism does not imply that we hypothesize that there is an "agenda scheduling device" hardwired into the brain. Rather, we feel this is a suitably general descriptive formalism to describe how internal states may be ordered. That they need ordering is assumed from the fact that skills are described by a hierarchical task structure (decomposition principle).

Finally, we assume that states can be adequately described by *attribute-pair* representations. That is, for each state, we can specify the universe of attributes that adequately represent the complete set of properties and relations and their value. We interpret an "attribute" rather loosely; any piece of information at all can be expressed, limited only by what is considered relevant to the domain. For example, we could postulate an attribute that a certain piece of information was in memory with a value true or false, or that certain actions had just taken place, or that something existed or had existed in the external environment. It is considered crucial to actually encode all such facts that may bear on the task domain.

All these assumptions, the grammar hypothesis, ordering hypotheses and representation assumption, come under the *decomposition* principle. These allow us to specify a theory of internal operators, that we can combine with the data-given external operators. We can also specify internal state given this theory. Of course, the task theory and the hypotheses we use to operationalize it may be wrong, and later we discuss how theories may be accepted or rejected in a proposal for hypothesis testing.

However, our descriptive task is not yet complete. Even though we now have a way to specify which states go with which operators, this information is not useful. A state description contains the universe of attributes applicable to a domain which may be true or false (or valued) at that given time. The regularity principle leads us to infer that out of this universe of attributes, some will be meaningfully (perhaps causally) related to the operator

application. Thus the second function of a descriptive theory of cognition must be to define a method to extract the most informative attributes from the complete universe. This is clearly an inductive task over the universe of attributes. The question is, which attributes are most highly predictive of an operator application. Thus the basis of the model is a general induction algorithm, in that the most predictive features will also be the most general features associated with an operator application. The model employs an induction formalism to determine which features of internal and external state are the most predictive. There is a parallel between the notion of concept formation, with its selection of the most general features of the instances of a concept, and the inductive task as it is performed by Cirrus. This parallel is discussed subsequently in the section on Induction and Psychological Modelling. The way in which the inductive generalization is accomplished is discussed below under Attribute Selection.

3. Induction and Psychological Modelling: a brief review

Cirrus utilizes an induction formalism known as decision trees (*Dtrees*). This formalism has a rich psychological background which is traced in this section. *Dtrees* had their first psychological application in the work on concept formation. The paradigm for this line of research was established by Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956). They studied how subjects form hypotheses about a concept on the basis of positive and negative exemplars. In these studies, concepts and thereby concept attainment was defined by critical attributes of the set of objects to be classified. Subjects were presented cards containing objects that could vary along four dimensions: number of objects, their shape, their colour and the number of borders surrounding them. Subjects had to discover a concept (i.e. certain values on 1 or more of the four attributes) that covered the positive instances presented but none of the negative instances. To do so, they had to identify which attributes were relevant (attribute identification) and the kind of rule which connects those attributes (conjunctive, disjunctive or

relational) (Anderson, 1980). Cirrus applies the notion of critical attributes of a concept formation rule to the critical features of a rule of operator application.

The combination of attributes selected was used as a rule for the application of a particular concept. As an extension of this, concepts can also be represented as a sequence of tests of the values of individual attributes. Simon and Feigenbaum (1979) employed such a formalism in their EPAM model of perceptual recognition. Tests on attributes of the stimuli led naturally to a decision tree representation, where attributes form a test at each node of a tree, whose branches are the values of that attribute. A concept is thus sorted down successive branches of the tree, until it arrives at a *leaf* of the tree. The *name* of the leaf is the label for the concept identified while the *denotation* of that name is the set of concepts sorted to that leaf. Thus the *concept* is the decision rule formed by tracing that path in the dtree. Cirrus adopts an EPAM-like tree representation, except that operator classes instead of concept classes are the labels of the leaves of the tree.

The EPAM model was an incremental model of concept formation unlike the model formulated by Hunt, Marin and Stone (1966) in their *Concept Learning System*. CLS was intended to solve single-concept learning tasks, the learned procedure then being capable of classifying new instances. They presented the decision tree process with a complete set of examples initially. For Hunt, Marin and Stone (1966) CLS was a device that discovered rules for combining previously learned concepts (attributes) to form a new decision rule. Similarly, Cirrus is presented with all the positive and negative instances at one time. Thus Cirrus is not a model of the acquisition process for operator-state pairing knowledge; rather it represents that knowledge of the problem solver as defined by their performance at that point in time. Quinlan (1983, 1986) extended the CLS model to deal with noise in *n*-ary attributes rather than binary, and with complex relational attributes rather than the feature-

value representation used in CLS. These improvements in the Dtree formalism were adopted in Cirrus, except that the feature-value representation format was retained.

Langely, Ohlsson and Sage (1984a, 1984b) have applied the decision tree formalism to modelling of student data in a similar manner to that presented here. However there are some important differences between the two models. Their model (ACM) takes as input, the answers to a problem domain rather than the actual solution paths, and ACM determines the solution path taken to arrive at that answer. It chooses the minimum cost solution path, which is an untenable assumption for students. For example, even in the simplified world of subtraction they employ, actual students show marked variation in solution paths while arriving at the correct answer. In more complex domains such as algebra, the variance in solution paths is quite astounding, even given students with the same learning history.

ACM forms separate decision trees for each operator, in contrast to Cirrus which forms only one Dtree to classify all the operators for a particular skill. In ACM's case, attributes are given positive or negative values according to whether they were present when the particular operator was applied. States are then sorted down the tree according to whether they were a positive instance of operator application or a negative instance. In Cirrus, the decision tree is formed over the whole problem space rather than over an individual operator. For Cirrus, adequate classification is assured since discrimination is incomplete (and marked as such) unless each leaf of the dtree contains only one class of operator. In Langley et al.'s formalism, inadequate discrimination between operators is not addressed. Finally, ACM employs a different mechanism for selecting the next attribute in building the tree. This point will be discussed in more detail under Attribute Selection. However, the major distinction between the two models is in the fact that Cirrus employs real protocol data rather than hypothesized or ideal data. This motivated many of the features of Cirrus, such as the noise-filter added to the attribute-selection mechanism. Overall, the inductive

attributes could be recoded in a binary format, this is conceptually non-problematic, but psychologically is less plausible. The procedure used by the CLS falls into the class of *category validity* methods of attribute selection, after Rosch's (1975) notions of family resemblance. Category validity methods seeks to maximize the coverage of each critical attribute over all the positive instances (Smith and Medin, 1981). That is, a feature is high in category validity to the extent of the number of instances of the category contain that feature. Although much research supports the category validity model (Rosch and Mervis, 1975 ; Medin, Wattenmaker and Michalski; in press), the CLS procedure for attribute selection is computationally intractable, since it can involve up to 3 serial searches, which seems uneconomic if the attribute space is large.

A more psychologically satisfying method was employed by Langley et al. (1984) in ACM. Their system computes the number of positive instances matching a given test (M_+) and the number of negative instances failing that test (U_-), and the total number of positive (T_+) and negative instances (T_-). ACM calculates the sum of the proportion of instance class to total class $S = \frac{M_+}{T_+} + \frac{U_-}{T_-}$ and then computes $E = \max(S, 2 - S)$. It is easy to see that an optimal test would be one that completely discriminated all the positive and negative examples. Such a test would receive a score of $1 + 1 = 2$. Similarly, a test with no discrimination would match only half the positive as well as half the negative examples, and so would score one. $0 - S$ gives the discriminability of negated tests.

This method works in the case of single attribute selections but fails when *multiple attribute selections* are considered. To illustrate the shortcomings of the above evaluation function, we shall treat the dtree as an information source, that is, the dtree can be seen as providing a classification and hence information. Information theory tells us that an act is informative to the extent that it reduces uncertainty, and the amount of information received is proportional

formalism that Cirrus uses to extract information from the universe of state features has a long history in the psychological literature.

3.1. Attribute Selection

The essential element of the regularity principle is to extract the most informative aspects of the external and internal state that predict the application of an operator. This section details the process of selecting these features from the universe that characterizes the state.

Dtrees work inductively to make classificatory decisions. In this case the tree contains nodes for the critical attributes only, rather than specifying the universe of attributes U . Such a partial description may be realized by several equivalent trees. Different attribute sets may adequately classify the universe of objects, but some will be better than others. The mechanism that determines the 'quality' of the generalization is that which chooses the attribute to discriminate at successive roots of the Dtree. Several methods have been employed in the previously discussed models and these are compared further in this section.

Hunt et al. (1966) proposes criteria based on cost minimization, costs associated with measurement, complexity of the tree and understandability for their CLS model. The optimal attribute for the root of the tree was chosen by a look-ahead method. This was accomplished as follows.

- 1 A search was made for an attribute value which appeared in *all* the positive instance descriptions and never in the negative instance descriptions. The dtree-building method halted if such an attribute was found, since it completely differentiated the world of objects.
- 2 If this search failed, the above procedure was then applied to negative objects.
- 3 If both steps 1 and 2 fail, then the attribute which has the highest frequency for a given value was selected.

Such a procedure assumes that only binary attributes are encoded. Since all n -ary

to the extent of uncertainty about the information to be received. Consider the following example taken from Garner (1962). If a coin is tossed in the air, then the uncertainty of that message is obviously determined by the number of possible outcomes, in this case two. If instead, a die is rolled, then the uncertainty would be greater since there are six possible outcomes. Thus, the roll of the die contains more information potential than the toss of the coin, since the outcome of the die is more uncertain.

Thus one measure of information would be the uncertainty of the event, measured by the number of outcomes for that event. This is the measure suggested by Langley et al. (1984) for ACM, since an attribute is selected as more informative if it accounts for more of the total uncertainty (i.e., the sum of positive and negative outcomes it correctly discriminates). However, consider the case when two coins or two die are tossed in the air. Two coins have 4 possible outcomes whereas two dice have 36 possible outcomes. Further, three coins do not provide us with 6 units of information potential (i.e., states of uncertainty) but 8.

Thus a simple linear additive model of accumulated information is clearly inadequate. The number of possible outcomes of an event does not give a measure of the uncertainty of that event. The measure which satisfies the above state of affairs must be a logarithmic model, rather than the linear model employed by ACM. This is so because a logarithmic function is monotonically related to the number of outcomes and each successive event adds the same amount of uncertainty as preceeding events.

This leads to the definition of the *bit*, the basic measurement unit of information. The uncertainty U of an event, and hence its potential for carrying information, can be measured by $U = c \log k$ where k is the number of outcomes of an event and c is a proportionality constant. It is accepted practise in information theory to utilize base 2 logarithms and to define the unit of measurement so that $c = 1$. Thus $U = \log_2 k$. Intuitively one bit of

information enables us to decide between two outcomes, whereas one bit of uncertainty involves doubling the number of categories of an outcome.

The above formula for uncertainty assumes that each value in k has an equal chance of occurring. Since the probability $p(x)$ of any one event occurring is the reciprocal of the total number of values in k , then $U = \log_2 \frac{1}{p(x)}$ (Garner, 1962). Thus $U = -\log_2 p(x)$ is the measure

of average uncertainty when all categories of x are equally likely. When there is a discrete probability distribution for x , the average uncertainty is computed by determining the uncertainty for each item and obtaining a weighted sum of these uncertainties. This weight will be just the probability of that category occurring. This transformation thus gives us Shannon's measure of average information: $U(x) = -\sum p(x) \log_2 p(x)$.

The preceding formula allows us to measure how informative any particular feature of internal or external state will be in deciding the correct operator to apply. A derivation of this measure is used in Cirrus to select the next attribute, the details of which will be discussed in a later section. The point here was to demonstrate the superiority of an information theoretic measure over the linear probability method employed by Langley et al., particularly when combinations of attributes must be considered. With regard to Smith and Medin's (1981) classification of attribute classes, this measure provides a basis for attribute selection according to the *cue validity* class of models, such that each attribute seeks to maximize the discriminability of the concept. Thus, a feature is selected according to how well it differentiates the application of an operator (or concept) from the space of all the domain operators. We will return to a discussion of cue validity vs. category validity models of attribute selection in discussing shortcomings of the model.

3.2. Summary

In this section, we have argued that we could understand the process of operator selection, termed *search control* if we knew what were the critical features of the *internal state* (features related to a domain theory of task decomposition) and the *external state* (the state of the problem or task). We claimed that although external features are given by the data, internal features need to be generated by a domain theory of task performance. This theory related to the decomposition of the top-level task into a subgoal hierarchy that is specified by the grammar hypothesis. Ordering of the task was scheduled by an agenda (agenda hypothesis) and the states so produced were encoded by an attribute-value representation.

To determine which of these feature were most informative, we argued that an information theoretic measure is the most appropriate to inductively select the critical features from the universe of internal and external features present at the time of each operator application. These assumptions, grouped under the grammar principle and regularity principle, allow the mechanization of determining the functional association of states and operators. In the following sections, we first discuss the actual implementation of Cirrus as a computer program, and then we illustrate its use in analysing solution path protocols from the domain of subtraction.

4. Computational Details of Cirrus

Cirrus is a multi-stage serial process with the following stages

- Data Encoding
- State Parsing
- Attribute Encoding
- Decision Tree construction
- Application

The following section describes each of these processing stages in turn. First, some general comments will be made on the computational basis of Cirrus. Overall, Cirrus is an example of the class of *similarity-based* induction formalisms (Mitchell, Keller and Kedar-Cabelli, 1986). It uses multiple training instances (solution path protocols) and an information theoretic inductive bias (Shannon's measure of average information, Quinlan, 1983). The output is expressed as a *decision tree*. It is not limited to conjunctive generalizations, as are some popular inductive formalisms, such as Version spaces (Mitchell, Utgoff & Banerji, 1983). Decision trees can handle disjunctive concepts equally well. This merely means that one concept (operator) will occupy multiple leaves of the tree. With that definition of the class of inductive methods, we can turn to examining the inputs or parameters that need to be given to Cirrus. To illustrate some of the computational mechanisms, examples from the domain of subtraction will be employed.

4.1. Data Encoding

As noted earlier, a problem space consists of states, particularly an initial state, and operators that transform those states. The succession of states from the initial to the goal state is termed the *solution path* for that problem. Cirrus accepts as input the solution path employed in solving a given problem. The sequence of states are displayed and the operator is asked to name the *primitive operators* corresponding the state change, transforming the data to a series of state-operator tuples. Note that the set of standard operators may need to be supplemented with various *buggy operators* if the student has non-standard primitives. Figure 1 illustrates the set of state-operator tuples that result from encoding a subtraction protocol.

INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

4.2. Farsing

Parsing converts the sequence of primitive operators into a goal structure according to a *grammar* that can successfully cover the input string. Figure 2 illustrates the *standard order* grammar that corresponds to the algorithm most commonly taught in schools for performing subtraction. Figure 3 shows a parse tree resulting from parsing a subtraction problem. It is clear from this diagram how a grammar can specify the goal hierarchy implicit in an instructed skill. Note that the adequacy of a grammar (and hence of the domain theory) is determined by its sufficiency to parse the input string, thus giving an empirical validation of the task decomposition theory.

INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE

Cirrus employs a bottom-up parsing algorithm with a variable constraint mechanism. The need for variable constraint parsing deserves closer attention as it illustrates some of the features of protocol data. An ordinary context-free parser builds parse trees that obey several constraints:

1. Constituents of a phrase appear in the order specified by the rule that sanctions building the phrase.
2. Constituents of a phrase abut each other: you can not skip over pieces of the string.
3. Constituents of a phrase do not overlap each other, they have to abut.
4. Constituents of a phrase have a category/type that is specified by the grammar rule that sanctions building the phrase.

These constraints are too confining for analyzing protocols: if one wishes to consider the possibility of non-deterministic order of sub-goal expansion (as implied by agenda scheduling) The Cirrus parser relaxes the first two constraints to allow for such possibilities. That is constituents need not be ordered nor abutting but they are still required to be non-

overlapping and to obey type restrictions. If the *grammar hypothesis* specifies that constituents abut or appear in a certain order, these requirements can be represented as predicates attached to the grammar rules. These predicates act as constraints such that the user can specify added requirements beyond those required by Cirrus.

As discussed previously, the *grammar hypothesis* specifies the task decomposition. This grammar must be extended to an annotated grammar to include specification of which method, if there are alternatives, is to be applied. For simplicity, the model assumes that in the case of a non-deterministic grammar rule (i.e., with multiple RHS), the operator itself encodes the information necessary to determine its applicability.

The output of the parsing stage is a goal-tree structure of state operator tuples. This tree is converted to an episodic sequence of tuples by a *tree walk* procedure that generates the hypothesized internal states (such as stack or agenda contents, and focus of attention contents). Thus the tree walk procedure specifies the remainder of the *grammar hypothesis*, the internal informational states resulting from the specified task decomposition. In this way, the internal state is built from the primitive operator sequence specified by the external solution path protocol.

4.3. Attribute Encoding

Each operator-state tuple is converted to an operator-attribute/set tuple by running the set of all domain attribute predicates over each state description. Recall that the state description includes the actual scratch marks made by the subject as well as the hypothesized internal state given by the parsing mechanism. Additionally, some attributes have access to the previous history of the problem solver (e.g., to episodic STM traces). The set of attributes classes that we determined adequate for the domain of subtraction can be classified as follows.

- *Internal State* attributes.
These attributes encode features of the internal state and are thus specific to the hypothesized model being explored. For example (*add/10-on-agenda*, *top-of-stack*).
- *Problem State Constant* attributes.
These encode features of the problem that are constant from state to state. For example (*number-zeros*, *number-columns*, *number-blanks*).
- *Focus of Attention* attributes.
These attributes encode features of the external state with respect to the column of the subtraction problem that the student is currently attending to. For example (*top < bottom*, *top < bottom-originally*, *bottom = blank*).
- *Rightmost Unanswered Column* attributes.
These attributes encode features of the external state with respect to the rightmost column whose answer row is still a blank. The actual features encoded are identical to the focus of attention attributes.
- *History* attributes.
These attributes encode previous events in the problem solving history. Most of these concern the previous operator applied, but some are flags indicating once only events. For example (*just-borrowed*, *borrowed-even*).

Of course, new attribute sets need to be constructed for each task domain. In general, a task analysis is usually sufficient to establish the universe of necessary attributes. Note that some of the complexity in the above description of the attribute set stems from the use of a *propositional* encoding of attribute-value pairs as opposed to a more powerful first-order predicate encoding. Thus attributes cannot take arguments, such as column-type. This explains why it is necessary to specify *Focus of Attention* problems distinct from *Rightmost Unanswered Column* problems. The output of this stage is a sequential list of operator-attribute tuples for each problem.

4.4. Decision Tree Construction

The final stage recursively constructs a decision tree. At each node, the most informative attribute, as defined subsequently, is selected. The operators sorted to this node are further discriminated according to their value on the selected attribute. The process halts if all the operators sorted to the node are identical (e.g., the unary set) or if there are no attributes

remaining which can discriminate the operators.

4.5. Attribute Selection

An information theoretic measure is utilized to determine the choice of the root and subsequent attributes in the Dtree. It is based on Shannon and Weaver's dictum that an event is informative to the degree that it permits one to decide among a set of alternative possibilities as to what it might have been. The justification for the following selection criteria is outlined in detail in Quinlan (1983, 1986) and is only briefly summarized here.

At any particular node, let C be the set of objects sorted to that node. C will contain the classes of operator $P..N$ with $p..n$ objects per class. Let N be the total number of objects in C . If a decision tree were to classify a random object at this point in the tree, it would assign the object to class P with the probability $\frac{p}{N}$. Thus, the information required to

classify an object as one of $P..N$ is then:

$$I_{(p..n)} = - \sum_{i=p}^n \frac{i}{N} \log_2 \frac{i}{N}$$

An attribute A with values $\{A_1, \dots, A_v\}$ will partition C into $\{C_1, \dots, C_v\}$ leaves, where C_i contains objects in C that have value A_i on attribute A . This set of objects will contain p_i items of class P and so on through class N . Thus the information that is given by the attribute A over the class of C objects is a weighted average of the total expected information, where the weight for each branch is the proportion of objects in C that belong to that branch:

$$E(A) = \sum_{i=1}^v \frac{p_i + \dots + n_i}{p + \dots + n} I(p \dots n)$$

Thus, the gain in information given by attribute A is the actual information needed to

generate a classification minus the expected information:

$$\text{gain}(A) = I(p..n) - E(A)$$

So, at each node in the Dtree, this quantity is computed for all the attributes that are not parents of the current node. The attribute which maximizes the gain of information at this node in the tree is selected, and the operators that have been sorted to this node are further discriminated by their values on the attribute so selected.

Two other factors must be considered in attribute selection; the influence of *noisy data* on attribute selection, and the *inflation of information content* by multiply-valued attributes (Quinlan, 1986). The source of noise could be misclassified objects on the basis of incorrect attribute value assignation or classification. Thus the tree building mechanism must know when the attribute set is unable to fully distinguish the classes of objects, and also when not to needlessly complicate the tree to classify incorrectly valued objects.

The chi-squared method (χ^2) suggested by Quinlan (1986) is employed as a noise filter. If an attribute is useful in classifying an object, then there will be a correlation of the values of the attribute with the class of objects in C . If an attribute is irrelevant to the classes of object, then the expected value p'_i of p_i will be:

$$p'_i = p \cdot \frac{p_i + \dots + n_i}{p + \dots + n}$$

This value can be utilized as the *expected value* in a normal chi-squared equation, and the resulting value checked against a stringent confidence interval ($p < .01$). In this way attributes whose value distribution is unassociated with class distributions will not be selected, thus giving some immunity to noise in the data.

Kononenko, Bratko and Roskar (1984, in Quinlan, 1986) report that the gain criteria

suggested by Quinlan (1984) is sensitive to the number of values in an attribute, favouring attributes with more values. Rather than limiting feature sets to binary attributes, Cirrus implements Quinlan's (1986) suggestion for overcoming this selection bias.

The output from Cirrus is a graphic tree representation of the decision tree. Each node of the tree represents an attribute which, at that node, carried the greatest information content in the overall discrimination of the operators. The arcs of the tree are the values of the discriminating attribute. The leaves of the tree represent the operator/s, thus the path from the root of the tree to that leaf represents the rule for applying that particular class of operators. Note that the most influential attributes (i.e., most informative) for an operators application will be high in the tree whereas the more trivial attributes, along with any remaining "noise" will be lower in the tree. This concludes our discussion of the implementation details of Cirrus. In the following section, we apply Cirrus to protocol data from the domain of subtraction, to illustrate this style of induction-based protocol analysis.

5. An Analysis of Subtraction Protocols

In this section, we apply the Cirrus method of descriptive analysis to subtraction protocol data. We will utilize as our Grammar hypothesis the standard order grammar depicted in Figure 3.

5.1. Procedure

The data analysed were 12 subtraction problems solved by P.D., a 3rd grade student. This student solved these items by paper and pencil test. In order to collect the exact writing actions, the test page was taped to an electronic tablet and PD filled out the test with a special pen. Tablet data was then converted to a sequence of character writing actions separated by measured pauses. (VanLehn, 1982, 1985, VanLehn and Ball, 1987). Each scratch mark made on the page defined an external state transition, hence each problem

could be encoded as a sequence of state transitions. The problem set is illustrated in Figure 4. The set of problems was designed so that *Borrow* and *Borrow from Zero* procedures were tested as well. Figure 5 illustrates the sequences of external states that PD wrote in the solution of one problem.

INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE

These sequences of solution path protocols were encoded as cartesian-coordinate problem representations. The first stage of Cirrus sequentially displayed the external state changes of the page and queried the operator for which of a predefined set of primitive operators could produce such a state change. The set of operators unambiguously corresponded to these external state changes. The list of normal and buggy operators that were found sufficient to encode a number of different subject's subtraction protocols is given in Table 1, along with the action implied by the operator's name. Each scratch mark made on the page defined an external state transition, hence each problem could be encoded as a sequence of state transitions.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The standard order grammar illustrated earlier was used to parse these external state/primitive operator pairs. The internalized state descriptions produced by the grammar hypothesis, along with the attribute set described previously complete the input parameters to Cirrus. From this input, Cirrus produced *Dtrees* that collapse across the 12 examples fed to the program.

5.2. Results

Figure 6 diagrams the results of Cirrus's analysis of the data². This tree structure requires some explanation before the actual results can be discussed. The nodes of the tree propose an attribute whose values are maximally informative in discriminating operators in the subtree below the node. Attributes that are higher in the tree are more informative than those lower in the tree. Values of the attribute (often just true or false) label the links between nodes. The tree can be seen as "sorting" operators to its leaves. The operator appears in a box under the leaf. When two or more operators appear together in a box, that means either no state features were capable of discriminating the operators or senseless attributes were being used in a "last ditch" effort to separate operators that reasonably should not be discriminated. The one case where this occurred is discussed below.

This tree needs to be considered in conjunction with the goal tree (grammar hypothesis) proposed for subtraction (Figure 2). First consider the leftmost branch of the dtree. The operators *Sub*, *Sub1Column*, *ShowTop* and *Decrement* can be correctly "scheduled" by reference only to the state of the agenda. Note that primitives pop themselves from the agenda when completed, as do goals when their subgoals have all been completed. Also, *ShowTop* is assumed to have been placed on the agenda rather than *Diff* due to method information encoded in the operator, as to its applicability. So if we know that we want to do a subtraction problem and we have not done anything yet (i.e., the agenda is empty) then we apply the goal operator *Subtract*. Likewise, if the subgoal to take the difference has not yet appeared on the agenda, then we want to subtract one column, and so on. What is significant here is that there is sufficient information just in what has appeared on the

²For purposes of simplifying the output, the cases where only one operator instance is sorted to a node, separated in a non-intuitive way from other class members, have been treated as "noise". Most likely these few instances (3 instances out of 215 operator applications) are caused by slips (Norman, 1981).

agenda to schedule these operators with out reference to any external state or subgoal ordering.

INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE

The remainder of the tree divides into two main subtrees. Note that if the goal to take the difference of two numbers (*Diff*) has been put on the agenda, then we are either going to be able to just take the difference, or we will need to borrow (called *Regroup* here). This is expressed by the middle branch of the tree, and of course, we decide between these two alternatives according to whether the top digit is less than the bottom digit in the right-most unanswered column ($RUC.T < B$). Note that this is the only feature of external state chosen by the tree. If *Regroup* has already been chosen and expanded, this means that the operator *Add 10* must be on the agenda (*Add/10.ON.AGENDA*). This attribute discriminates at a higher level of the tree whether to process a column (*Diff* or *Regroup*) or complete the borrowing process.

The rightmost branch of the tree deals with scheduling the operators to complete the borrow procedure. Interestingly, the ordering of these operations (*Decrement*, *Add/10*, *ScratchMark*, *From* and *Regroup*) is probably the least determined by the standard order algorithm as taught by schools. This is reflected in the *Dtree* attribute nodes, which refer to a variety of internal states, including memory states. For PD, *Scratchmark* is the first operator executed whenever it appears on the agenda. This is sensible since this mark is a temporary reminder to decrement. If we have made a scratch mark (*Just/Scratchmark*), then we are going to *Add/10* or *Decr.* the remaining two operators left in the borrow sequence. The actual output *dtree* could differentiate these operators by appealing to psychologically implausible attributes (Number of top zeros and whether the top digit was originally zero). Subjects themselves show greater variability in scheduling these two operators both between

subjects and even within subjects in the same problem. Since the order of applying these does not affect the outcome of the procedure (i.e., its correctness) perhaps the dtree is just reflecting a basic indeterminacy in this scheduling and selecting only spuriously associated state features. (Recall that the attributes lower in the tree are less important and predictive). For this reason, we show the operators together.

Finally, the remainder of the tree uses a memory trace to schedule the remaining *Add/10* operators directly after a decrement operation. These *Add/10* operators are different from the previous group of *Add/10* operators in that these do not occur in the context of borrowing. Alternatively, if one has not yet performed the basic operators for borrow, (*Decr Add/10*, *ScratchMark*) then one executes the planning operators for borrowing: *From* and *Regroup*. These operators are just ordered by their appearance on the agenda, *Regroup* being performed first (which indeed it must before *From* can be executed)

Thus the analysis of this Dtree suggests that the Circus method of descriptive analysis tells us the information used by this student in performing the complete range of subtraction skills. It has certainly presented a coherent theory of the skills required to control the execution of a subtraction procedure (**search control**). Subtraction for multi-column problems is viewed as a procedure rather than a skill requiring search. This is reflected in the Dtree in that only one external state feature is needed to effectively sequence a complex collection of skills. The top-most ordering for this skill derives from the task decomposition given in the grammar. This analysis also predicts that the only intermediate results that PD needs to store in working memory (*Just/Scratchmark* and *Just/Decn*) are involved in sequencing the more complex Borrow operation. One could speculate that the reason students have more trouble in acquiring borrowing skills is due to this extra memory demand. Interestingly, the results demonstrate that relatively unstructured ordering principles such as agendas are nevertheless sufficient to schedule complex operator sequences with very little additional information.

In the next section, these results are related to a wider view of what can be accomplished with the use of such an automated method of analysis.

6. Discussion

We take the previous example as evidence for the utility of a descriptive theory of cognition. However, how might such results be utilized? Cirrus is seen as having three major applications. These three applications, *data reduction/analysis*, *student modelling* and *architectural hypothesis testing* are described with regard to the *problem space hypothesis*, using the data just analysed.

Recall that for the problem space hypothesis, problem solving and other phenomena are viewed as search within the domain of the problem space. One way we could describe the process of operator selection (*search control*) is to know which features (attributes) of the internal and external states are most predictive (and hence, presumably causal) of operator application. By knowing these features, we would know what external cues and internal states of the information processor "drove" the sequence of operators observed. Previous approaches to protocol analysis (Bhaskar and Simon, 1977; Ericsson and Simon, 1984) offered no mechanistic way that such an analysis could be conducted. The model Cirrus described in this paper offers an automated method for exploring these kinds of data analysis. In the next section, we propose three difficulties in the traditional approach to protocol analysis, and describe how Cirrus might answer these difficulties.

6.1. Limitations of Protocol Analysis of Solution Paths

As a method of enquiry, protocol analysis of solution path data has several unresolved issues that stem from the above noted need to describe the internal states of the processor and the external cues that predict operator application.

- To date, most empirical studies of the problem space hypothesis have concerned the protocol analysis of single subjects. No adequate technology as yet exists for

comparing and contrasting the solution-paths of multiple data-sets. Nor has there been a means of reducing the data of solution paths so that only the essential features are considered. There is not the means for conducting hypothesis tests of group differences, a standard resource for data comparison. This limits protocol-based studies to descriptive rather than evaluative formats. We term this the need for *data reduction/analysis*.

- The output of protocol analysis is potentially useful in many facets of student modelling, from assesment of learned procedures to intelligent tutoring system uses. However, it is at present not feasible to utilize such data in any "real time" sense, since protocol analysis involves tedious handcoding of large amounts of data, and the promulgation of many "intuitive" but untested assumptions. There is a need to automate this analysis process so that student models can be built in real-time, with a clearly defined set of assumptions. We term this the need for *automated student modelling*.
- The problem space hypothesis leaves under-determined the *ordering principle*, control processes that schedule the application of operators to achieve the goal state. There are many applicable models in the artificial intelligence literature, from planning models to blind search models, but there has been no easy way to test the architectural assumptions with respect to their fit to the data. Anderson (1983) has argued that such an issue may in fact be undecidable, since an infinitude of machines can model arbitrary input/output relationships. Nevertheless, such models of internal architecture have been proposed in the literature. We feel that there is a need to evaluate such descriptive models against real solution path data. We term such an evaluation of *ordering principle adequacy*.

These three issues, of *data reduction/analysis*, *ordering principle testing* and *automated student modelling* are elaborated next in greater detail, along with an indication as to how Cirrus may solve these problems.

6.2. A Basis for Data Reduction.

There are two critical ways in which solution path data may be utilized. Firstly, we wish to know which of the universe of features of a problem state are the relevant ones, that is, what aspects of the data are causal or correlated with the outcome? Secondly, how can different sets of data, once the critical aspects of the data have been found, be compared.

The first problem is one of induction over the universe of attributes. That is, which attributes are most highly predictive of an operator application. This information is directly

available as the result of Cirrus's analysis. Referring back to Figure 6, we can see what is important in learning how to execute a subtraction procedure. For the operators that establish the topmost goals (*Sub*, *Sub1Col*) in subtraction, only their order of appearance on the agenda is required. Similarly, if one does not take the difference in a column (i.e., *Diff* not on agenda), then one will just write down the top digit (*ShowTop*). From this, it is tempting to hypothesize that learners learn just the sequence of activities for these operators.

Obviously, the most crucial piece of information is whether $\text{top} < \text{bottom}$, in order to decide whether to take the difference or to initiate borrowing. Thus the borrowing procedure is executed when we have two conflicting pieces of evidence. If *Diff* is on the agenda, but $\text{top} < \text{bottom}$, then we must delay executing *Diff* and do *Regroup* first. Thus for this operator, learned sequences are contingent on external states. Likewise, ordering of operators may be contingent on the history of previous actions, as it is for *Add10* or decrementing, which occur after making a scratch mark on the page.

Cirrus then, is capable of separating from state representations what is important knowledge in skilled performance. For further analysis, one may wish to assess the extent of differences between subjects solution paths as a function of different treatment or sampling conditions. Previous protocol approaches that have tried to compare across groups have assumed a metric scaling space and rated the protocols on various dimensions within this space, assessing similarity or difference by traditional statistical methods. However, this approach is unsatisfactory for several reasons. Firstly the measures that are inferred from the data are those that fit the subjective view of the experimenter as to what is interesting to examine. Secondly Tversky (1977) has questioned the validity of the geometric approach in that the assumption of a metric scaling space is often untenable where judgements of similarity are concerned.

Tversky suggests instead a contrast model of analysis, employing a linear combination of common and different feature sets to assess similarity. Such a matching function can measure the degree to which two objects, viewed as a set of features, match each other. Such an analysis needs a comparison of feature set commonalities and differences rather than a computation of metric distances between points of inferred constructs. However, before such a matching function can apply, there is a prior necessary process of the extraction and compilation of the relevant set of features maximally associated with an operator application. The model Cirrus performs the preliminaries to such an analysis, by extracting the critical features from the universe of attributes.

In summary, we perceived a need to discern the critical features of external and internal state that maximally predict an operator's application. Such an analysis can firstly be employed for data reduction, so that complex protocol data can be understood by noting only the critical features. Further, this type of data reduction could be further employed as input to an analysis of feature similarities and differences, that would serve as a basis for within or between subject comparison. Cirrus exactly meets these requirements.

6.3. Automated Student Modelling

There is a further extension of the model beyond a theoretical basis for data reduction. If the assumptions of the model (the grammar hypothesis and the ordering hypothesis) are appropriate for human problem-solvers, then Cirrus can serve as a model for the process of operator selection, that is, a student model. This is a stronger theoretical claim than the previous one of determining the state features that "cause" an operator application. Here we are saying that the process utilized by Cirrus to discriminate when a particular operator should be applied may be analogous to the process a student utilizes when solving a problem. That is, Cirrus in this role, is describing the actual search control mechanism employed by a problem solver. Thus, the output of Cirrus (decision trees), would be

hypothesized to be control knowledge employed by the problem solver.

Domains such as subtraction, algebra and physics fall readily into the *Problem Space hypothesis* approach, where the basic manipulations constitute the operators within the problem space. The task for the student is to apply the correct sequence of operators to move from the initial to the goal state. Such learning may be termed *Search control*. How this knowledge is induced from examples, and the form of this knowledge are interesting questions. We imagine that the form of this knowledge could be described as falling along what may loosely be described as an external-internal state descriptor dimension. At one pole is the kind of search control knowledge described by Lewis and Anderson (1985) as schema abstracted from problem examples that predict when and when not a particular operator will work. These schemata contain certain problem features that are properties of the problem diagram and information contained in the problem description. They conclude that search control can be described as a correlation between surface features of the problem state (external state) and the correct rules of inference for these problems.

At the other pole are models which propose that what is learnt as search control is an internal structure which guides the sequence of operator application. As an example, VanLehn (1985) argues that problem solvers learn a goal hierarchy which specifies the order of operator application. Thus, there are internal features of the processor state (internal state) that when learnt, can guide the execution of a complex skill. Inevitably, search control will consist of a mixture of external state features and internal state features. In terms of modelling the search control acquired by a learner it would be instructive to know what these critical features are.

Cirrus exactly describes what the balance is between search type attributes and internal procedural attributes. Given solution path protocols, Cirrus can now determine the features

of the internal and external state that the student has most likely employed in reaching a solution. This data can then be employed in student modelling applications, be it evaluation of the search control strategies employed by the student for research purposes, diagnosis of incorrect operator application caused by attention to incorrect features of the problem-state in teaching situations, determining differential procedures following differing teaching histories, or building representations of the student in ICAI applications.

6.4. Evaluation of Decomposition and Ordering Principles

The two most significant free parameters of Cirrus are the ordering hypothesis and the task decomposition hypothesis. Both of these can be varied and the resultant models evaluated on a "what if?" basis. We have argued for an *agenda* ordering structure on the grounds of its generality. However, we could postulate more constrained ordering principles. For example, we may postulate that a subject uses a stack architecture. That is, the plan or procedure that the subject follows is represented following a stack regime, such that when all the sub-goals of a goal are accomplished, then that goal can be popped off the stack. Note that the stack model is a more restricted case than the *agenda* regime used here. The primary feature of stack regimes is deterministic ordering of subgoal expansion, against non-deterministic expansion order in an agenda.

The choice of ordering principle suggests the set of internal attributes to supplement the already established set of external attributes. For example, in the case of a stack architecture, relevant attributes may be *top of stack* and *depth of stack*. Finally, the set of operator states (primitives plus sub-goal operators determined by the hypothesized architecture) resulting from the parsed problem, together with the concomittant encoding of attribute sets are utilized to construct a decision tree. The decision tree represents the *control structure* that directs the execution of the procedure on the hypothesized architecture.

Different architectural models and the resultant control structures may then be compared with each other. We have no formal way of contrasting the resultant Decision trees, instead we rely on the following heuristics to evaluate "goodness of fit". The ordering principle that utilizes a minimal set of features to produce decision trees of maximal simplicity and psychological plausibility is selected on the grounds of parsimony. Further bases for comparison arise from the fact that building such an "executable" model of search control demonstrates the limitations inherent in the proposed architecture. For example, the above illustrated *stack model* architecture, with its order determined sequence of subgoal expansion may be too inflexible to account for actual solution path data in a plausible manner.

The ability to manipulate such parameters and estimate their effect on the knowledge structures depicted by the resultant Dtrees seems advantageous in the construction of theoretical models.

6.5. Limitations and Problems

The heart of the Cirrus model is the inductive method employed in selecting attributes. We have noted that the information theoretic model employed falls into the *cue validity* class of induction models. That is, attributes are selected on their ability to *discriminate* between operator classes. (Here, the basis of discrimination is information content). However, we have no guarantee that this is the strategy employed by human subjects. Indeed, there is evidence that in the domain of concept formation, humans utilize *category validity* methods. Here, attributes are selected on their correlation with the set of other attributes defining a concept (Medin, Wattenmaker and Michalski, in press; Rosch and Mervis, 1975). The difference between the knowledge structures arising from cue versus category methods has yet to be explored, and an extension of the Cirrus model would be to incorporate an alternative category-validity attribute selection method.

The model uses an attribute-value encoding, a relatively weak propositional formalism for knowledge representation. More compact and powerful state descriptions may result from adopting a first order predicate state representation, particularly in expressing relational information. The extent of the limitation from a propositional representation is not yet clear.

6.6. Conclusions

In the introduction, we argued that theories of cognition that drew their sources of theoretical constraints from functional analyses of task domains should limit their hypotheses to functionally based statements about competence. In the analysis presented here, we have taken a theory of how subjects decompose the task of subtraction (the *decomposition* hypothesis) and generated a representation of a problem-solver's internal and external state constrained by this theory. From this, we have been able to extract the knowledge structures utilized by the problem solver, that adequately explain the competence demonstrated.

In doing so, we have not needed to hypothesize an *architecture* that would serve to execute this knowledge. We believe that this is an important advantage of the current method. Not only does it obviate the need for ad hoc test and generate cycles to determine the "rule structure" of a particular task domain (as would a conventional production system analysis), but it does not build structural mechanisms based only on functional constraints. Thus there is no temptation to reify descriptive mechanisms to the status of an actual structural mechanism. Neither have we elevated the regularities found in a subject's performance to the status of a *rule*, that is, something that is explicitly represented in the neural substrate. Instead we have described observed competence, and can leave theories concerning how such competence may be represented and processed to theories that concern the structural requirements for computation.

Finally, we have sketched how such a method of analysis may be applied to interesting problems. We considered the problems of automated analysis of protocols, particularly online protocols of say, a student in a tutoring situation. We demonstrated how Cirrus could meaningfully extract a model of the student's competence. The applications of this to intelligent tutors that need to build models of that same competence are apparent. We briefly considered how the induction method of Cirrus might be used to perform group analyses of protocol data, and suggested how different domain theories might be compared.

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List of Figures

Figure 1:	State Operator Encoding Window	0
Figure 2:	Standard Order Grammar for Subtraction	1
Figure 3:	Parse Tree for Subtraction with Borrow	2
Figure 4:	Subtraction Problem set for P.D.	3
Figure 5:	Sequence of External State Changes	4
Figure 6:	Decision Tree for P.D.	6

Error and Type			
SUB	----	SUB1COL	SUB
SUB	----	SUB1COL	
SUB1COL	----	Diff	
SUB1COL	----	Show/Top	
SUB1COL	----	REGROUP	Diff
REGROUP	----	FROM	Add/10
FROM	----	REGROUP	FROM
FROM	----	ScratchMark	Dech
Action when Grammar selected			
Yes		No	

Figure 2: Standard Order Grammar for Subtraction




Figure 3: Parse Tree for Subtraction with Borrow

<p>1</p> $\begin{array}{r} 647 \\ - 45 \\ \hline 602 \\ 02 \end{array}$	<p>2</p> $\begin{array}{r} 8305 \\ - 3 \\ \hline 8302 \end{array}$	<p>3</p> $\begin{array}{r} 885 \\ - 205 \\ \hline 680 \end{array}$	<p>4</p> $\begin{array}{r} 713 \\ 83 \\ - 44 \\ \hline 39 \end{array}$
<p>5</p> $\begin{array}{r} 410 \\ 86 \\ - 23 \\ \hline 27 \end{array}$	<p>6</p> $\begin{array}{r} 512 \\ 562 \\ - 3 \\ \hline 559 \end{array}$	<p>7</p> $\begin{array}{r} 1418 \\ 54811 \\ 8891 \\ - 2697 \\ \hline 3894 \end{array}$	<p>8</p> $\begin{array}{r} 10 \\ 2011 \\ 311 \\ - 214 \\ \hline 097 \end{array}$
<p>9</p> $\begin{array}{r} 10 \\ 7013 \\ 1613 \\ - 215 \\ \hline 1598 \end{array}$	<p>10</p> $\begin{array}{r} 310015 \\ 4015 \\ - 607 \\ \hline 3408 \end{array}$	<p>11</p> $\begin{array}{r} 9910 \\ 01010012 \\ 10012 \\ - 214 \\ \hline 9798 \end{array}$	<p>12</p> $\begin{array}{r} 99 \\ 7101011 \\ 8001 \\ - 43 \\ \hline 7958 \end{array}$

Figure 4: Subtraction Problem set for P.D.




Figure 5: Sequence of External State Changes




Figure 6: Decision Tree for P.D.

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